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Bringing propaganda back into news media studies 
 
Florian Zollmann, Newcastle University, UK 
 
Abstract 
With the ascendance of liberal democracy, propaganda activities have vastly increased. 
The main aim of propaganda has been to protect state-corporate power from the threat 
of public understanding and participation. Because of its societal importance for public 
opinion formation, the news media constitutes an obvious channel for the dissemination 
of propaganda. However, contemporary communication, media and journalism studies 
have mostly neglected to critically assess the news media’s role in producing and 
distributing propaganda. In fact, despite of the news media’s integration into the state-
corporate nexus, the term propaganda is rarely used in academic treatises on the news 
media. Furthermore, only a small number of scholars have engaged in elaborating a 
systematic understanding of the manifold propaganda techniques that are currently 
applied in liberal democracies. To fill these research gaps, this article maps out various 
concepts of propaganda and relates them to the process and content of the news media. 
On the basis of theoretical and empirical studies, the article demonstrates how different 
forms of propaganda can manifest in news media content. Based on an integration with, 
as well as a development of, existing literature, the essay aims to build a tool box that 
can be applied and refined in future studies in order to detect propaganda in news 
media texts. 
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Introduction 
The news media constitute a central channel for the dissemination of information in 
liberal democracies. Additionally, scholars see the news media as a crucial institution 
for democratic decision-making: in theory, the news media provide a significant portion 
of the information on which citizens base their political choices (see Jarren and Donges, 
2002: 143-145; also Curran and Seaton, 2010; Page, 1996).  
 
Yet, despite its societal and political importance, the news media are rarely assessed in 
terms of how powerful interests have co-opted them to disseminate propaganda. Some 
propaganda scholars, such as Bussemer (2005: 389-397), even claim that contemporary 
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democracies consist of decentralised communication systems which render propaganda 
virtually obsolete. 
 
That this disregard of the important role of propaganda in liberal democracies has a 
history, is indicated by the scholarly treatment of Lazarsfeld and Merton’s (1957  
[1948]) classic text ‘Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organised Social 
Action’. This essay constitutes ‘one of the most frequently cited and anthologized’ texts 
in media and communication studies (Simonson and Weimann, 2003: 12). Yet, contrary 
to ‘received wisdom’ in academia, the authors endorsed the notion of that the news 
media played a role ‘in maintaining capitalist hegemony’ by means of propaganda 
(Simonson and Weimann, 2003: 12-13). 
 
Lazarsfeld and Merton argued that ‘chief power groups, among which organised 
business occupies the most spectacular place’ in liberal democracies used ‘economic 
power’ for ‘psychological exploitation, achieved largely by disseminating propaganda 
through the mass media of communication’ (1957 [1948]: 457-458). Moreover, as 
Lazarsfeld and Merton (1957 [1948]: 465) further pointed out, propagandistic news 
media performance resulted from the fact that ‘the mass media are supported by great 
business concerns geared into the current social and economic system’ and thus 
‘contribute to the maintenance of that system’. As a consequence, they argued, the news 
media failed to ‘raise essential questions about the structure of society’ and thus 
restrained ‘the cogent development of a genuinely critical outlook’ (1957 [1948]: 465). 
Lazarsfeld and Merton’s (1957 [1948]: 466) essay suggested that social objectives ‘are 
consistently surrendered by commercialized media when they clash with economic 
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gains’. On a more general level, Lazarsfeld and Merton had observed how in liberal 
democracies, propaganda had taken the ‘place of more direct means of control’ arguing 
that ‘this change in the structure of social control merits thorough examination’ (1957 
[1948]: 457-458). Yet, in contemporary communication, media and journalism studies, 
there is a reluctance to pursue the kind of critical institutional analysis of the role of 
propaganda in liberal democracies and its relationship with the news media, as 
demanded by Lazarsfeld and Merton who were two of the leading early scholars in the 
field.  
 
More than fifty years after Lazarsfeld and Merton’s essay was published, it is time to 
reassess the relationship between the news media and propaganda. Such an undertaking 
is important for several reasons: First, liberal democracies are highly stratified and 
research suggests that governance on issues such as welfare, economics, and foreign 
policy is biased towards elite interests (see Ferguson, 1995; Miller and Dinan, 2010; 
Page, 1996; Zollmann, 2015d). Secondly, under the guise of the ‘war on terror’, the US, 
UK and Germany have been engaging in continuous war in the Middle East, North 
Africa and Eurasia with serious consequences for the target societies as well as 
domestic populations (see Zollmann, 2015d). And thirdly, anthropogenic climate 
change as well as potential future nuclear disasters threaten the survival of the human 
species. How these interest-driven issues will be governed in the future is at least partly 
determined by the news media as a major institution of information circulation. 
Theorizing the relationship between the news media and propaganda is thus crucial.  
 
As Silverstein (1987: 50) stressed, ‘propaganda analysis lacks a basic body of 
 4 
literature’. According to Silverstein (1987: 54), propaganda studies should consider the 
different ‘forms’ of propaganda and build a scientific tool box that systematizes the 
processes and contents of propaganda. Such a conceptual framework for the study of 
propaganda and its related activities has recently been provided by Bakir et al.’s (2016) 
text ‘Rethinking Propaganda as a Sub-Set of Organised Persuasive Communication 
[henceforth OPC]’. Bakir et al. (2016) also observed the need to study the occurrence of 
unintentional propaganda, promulgated ‘either through misperception, self-deception or 
institutionally’. In fact, unintentional and institutional propaganda is produced and 
distributed by journalists because news organisations are constrained by state-corporate 
power. Institutional pressures are geared into the news media system in the fashion 
outlined by Lazarsfeld and Merton. Journalists adhere to institutional constraints 
because of their socialisation in the newsroom as well as internalisation of dominant 
values, norms and ideologies (see Zollmann, 2009, 2012, 2017). Journalists thus 
unintentionally produce and disseminate propaganda. Gans (1980) indirectly referred to 
this process in his major work on journalistic gatekeeping. Gans stated at the end of his 
study that he had ‘largely ignored the intriguing possibility that journalists and their 
firms are pawns of larger and more basic social processes to which they unwittingly 
respond’ (Gans 1980: 290). Similarly, contemporary media and communication studies 
have not much to say about these processes and the prevalence of propaganda in the 
news (see Herman 1986: 174-175). Moreover, a second assumption about propaganda is 
that it must be based on one-dimensional falsehoods. Some scholars have thus argued 
against a conflation of news and propaganda (see for example Allan, 2004 and Hallin, 
1994). 
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To rectify these misconceptions, this study relates to Bakir et al.’s framework and the 
work of other propaganda scholars in order to build a tool box that can be used to detect 
propaganda in the news. Moreover, the study assesses whether the concept of 
propaganda can be used to describe the performance of the news media. Based on an 
integration as well as development of existing literature, the essay will demonstrate that 
news media mediated propaganda is often distributed unintentionally and may be based 
on facts. 
 
The article proceeds in several steps: In the first section, I will discuss the 
marginalisation of propaganda in academia. Afterwards, I will introduce Herman and 
Chomsky’s (2008) Propaganda Model (henceforth PM) as the main approach that has 
contextualized the processes that explain why the news media constitutes a propaganda 
system. However, scholars using PM have been criticized for not addressing the 
question of whether their findings, largely derived from content studies, actually prove 
that news media texts are propagandistic. The main part of this article will consequently 
demonstrate that major findings generated from content and theoretical studies actually 
match with how leading scholars have classified the properties of propaganda. 
 
The marginalisation of propaganda 
With the ascendancy of liberal democracy, propaganda was instituted in order to govern 
people through the management of perception and behaviour. In a prominent initial 
formulation, Bernays (2005 [1928]) designated propaganda to a broad range of 
promotional activities conducted by business, governmental or non-governmental 
organisations as well as the news media. In accord with the realist paradigm, Bernays 
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(2005 [1928]: 54) argued that if elites ‘can no longer do what they want without the 
approval of the masses, they find in propaganda a tool which is increasingly powerful in 
gaining that approval’. 
 
During the first half of the twentieth century and subsequently, scholarship detected a 
vast increase in propaganda activities. Already in 1927, Lasswell (1971 [1927]: 34) had 
identified the development of ‘a corps of men who do nothing but study the ways and 
means of changing minds or binding minds to their convictions’. ‘Propaganda’, 
Lasswell (1971 [1927]: 34) observed, had ‘become a profession’. Peel (1944: 268) 
stressed how, since World War I, propaganda had been ‘organised as an industry’ and a 
‘science of propaganda’ had developed (see also Mathews, 1957: 186). 
 
Writing several decades later, Carey documented how propaganda was applied as a 
means of ‘consent-engineering’ and ‘social and ideological control’ in democratic 
societies in which power and privilege are not predominantly shielded by coercive force 
but are susceptible to public opinion (1995: 21, 81). Carey (1995: 18) highlighted how 
the increase in democracy, most notably the extension of the popular vote and the 
expansion of the trade union movement, was countered by professional propaganda 
originating from the corporate sector that regarded democracy as a threat to its power. 
 
Similarly, Miller and Dinan, who expanded on the work of Carey, regarded the PR 
industry as ‘a huge apparatus for legitimating the interests of the few at the expense of 
the many’ (2008: 5, 181). Miller and Dinan (2008: 6) argued it became increasingly 
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important to facilitate ‘elite unity’ – of different corporate and political fractions – 
through propaganda-managed action (see also Miller and Dinan, 2000). 
 
However, despite its societal significance, the term propaganda has largely been 
excluded from debates about public opinion formation in liberal democracies. This 
constitutes a rather recent phenomenon. For instance, at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the term was unambiguously used by business practitioners in order to describe 
their promotional activities (Miller and Dinan, 2008: 18). Only after World War I, 
during which the same propaganda measures had been applied by the belligerent parties 
to generate support for their war efforts, did business leaders introduce ‘the term “public 
relations”’ (Miller and Dinan, 2008: 18). Propaganda had also been associated with the 
German Nazi regime whose news and information operations were based on the 
propaganda techniques prescribed in the early business literature written by pioneers 
such as Bernays and Ivy Lee (Miller and Dinan, 2008: 18).  
 
Philologically, a neutral or positive connotation of the term was thus negated in its 
meaning because both World War experiences demonstrated the manipulative potential 
of propaganda. As a consequence, new terminology was not only established in the 
industries but also in academia where researchers increasingly kept away from the use 
of the propaganda terminology particularly in treatises on Western democracies (see 
Carey, 1995: 1; Miller and Dinan, 2008: 5; Schulz, 2004: 518). During this process, 
academic fields were rebranded: the disciplines which nowadays contain what had 
initially been designated as propaganda studies are PR and advertising as well as 
subjects within psychology and sociology (cf. Jowett and O’Donnell, 1992: 117-119; 
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Miller and Dinan, 2008: 4-5; Schulz, 2004: 518; Silverstein, 1987: 50). Moreover, 
media, communication and journalism related research has largely neglected to 
scrutinise the central role of propaganda in our societies. For various reasons it has 
remained convenient to sidestep an assessment of the problematic nature of PR and 
advertising as propaganda techniques. Similarly, the news media’s role as a main 
producer and purveyor of propaganda is rarely assessed. While US-American scholars 
of the 1930s, who established the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, emphasised the 
prevalence of propaganda in newspaper, radio, or magazine productions (see Institute 
for Propaganda Analysis, 1995 [1937]: 223), the propaganda perspective is virtually not 
applied in contemporary academic works about the news (see Mullen, 2010). 
 
The marginalisation of propaganda is striking because, as Simpson highlighted, the field 
of ‘communication research’ is rooted in US-government and intelligence funded 
‘psychological warfare programmes’ (Simpson 1994: 2). This means that many of the 
foundational centres of post-war communication studies such as Paul Lazarsfeld’s 
Bureau of Applied Social Research (Columbia University), Hadley Cantril’s Institute 
for International Social Research (Princeton) and Ithiel de Sola Pool’s Center for 
International Studies (MIT) operated in the government-psychological warfare nexus 
(Simpson 1994: 2). According to Simpson (Simpson 1994: 52): 
 
For the first decade after 1945 – which is to say, the decade in which 
communication studies crystallized into a distinct academic field, complete with 
colleges, graduate degrees, and so on – U.S. military, propaganda, and 
intelligence agencies provided the large majority of all project funding for the 
field. 
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Out of these scientific undertakings grew a dominant research paradigm that defined the 
field (see Simpson 1994: 52). This foundational research has been concerned with areas 
that are still important to this day, such as media effects, public opinion and audiences, 
diffusion, motivation, two-step communication, content analysis, national media 
systems and development theory (Simpson 1994: 107-116). These certainly constitute 
valid research areas. Yet, US-government funding for psychological warfare studies 
incentivised a particular application of research largely concerned with how to 
effectively persuade and dominate target audiences (Simpson 1994: 5). Incidentally, 
such applied social management research suited both US political as well as commercial 
interests. In terms of the former, one main goal of psychological warfare has been to 
manage opinions in the Third World and Europe in order to keep these regions in the 
US sphere of influence (Simpson 1994: 7). In terms of the latter, the corporations 
benefitted from research that could be used to measure and direct attention towards their 
products and services as well as to techniques to manage politics and policy (see 
Simpson 1994: 19). Simpson (1994: 3) thus argued that the military, intelligence and 
propaganda agencies, ‘helped bankroll substantially all of the post-World War II 
generation’s research into techniques of persuasion, opinion measurement, 
interrogation, political and military mobilization, propagation of ideology and related 
questions’. These developments help to explain why the dominant terminology applied 
in media, communication and journalism studies has shielded the role of academia in 
developing propaganda techniques as well as the existence of a vast propaganda 
apparatus of which the news media is, it is argued here, a crucial part (see Althusser, 
1971: 154).  
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Hence, in the light of this discussion, there is no reason why the news media should not 
be scrutinized as potentially a channel for propaganda. Indeed, such an undertaking 
should be an academic priority. As Lasswell (1971 [1927]: 46) pointed out back in the 
1920s: propaganda techniques ‘may be perverted to partisan, personal and class ends’. 
 
News media and propaganda 
Why should news media performance be framed in terms of propaganda? The news 
media are seen as central to the distribution of propaganda by a number of scholars. For 
instance, Jowett and O’Donnell (1992: viii) identify the ‘range of new communication 
technologies’ and ‘myriad channels for disseminating information’ as obvious 
‘opportunities for increased propaganda activities’.1 Scholars who have postulated a 
propaganda function of the news media point to their integration into the state-corporate 
market nexus as well as to the influences of powerful lobby groups (see Curtis, 1995: 
165; DiMaggio, 2009; Edwards and Cromwell, 2006; Herman, 1986; Herman and 
Chomsky, 1988, 2008; Keeble, 1997; Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1957 [1948]: 457-458; 
Miliband, 1987 [1973]: 197-198; 211; Smythe, 1981: 39; Winter, 2007).  
 
Perhaps the most widely used propaganda approach to the news media is Herman and 
Chomsky’s (1988, 2008) Propaganda Model which describes a set of five news ‘filters’ 
that guide news selection processes and lead to propagandistic output (see 2008: 1-29). 
Largely based on US data, the PM emphasises how ownership, corporate control and 
advertising funding as well as market forces shape the respective behavior of managers, 
journalists and external actors/institutions that provide information to or put pressure on 
the news media (Herman 1986, 2000; Herman and Chomsky 1988, 2008). As a 
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consequence of these institutional constraints, the PM proposes that news media content 
is generally aligned with state-corporate elite interests at various time/space contexts 
(see Herman, 1986, 2000; Thompson 2009). The PM does not suggest news media 
performance to be monolithic, nor that the dissemination of propaganda is its only 
activity. Moreover, the PM does not specifically assess how effective propaganda may 
be (Herman and Chomsky, 2008: IL; see also Herman, 1986, 2000; Thompson 2009).  
 
It should be further noted that PM’s economic and ideological processes are 
uncontroversial and had, in isolation, already been identified by the so-called 
Gatekeeper researchers as well as scholars concerned with the political economy of the 
news like Lazarsfeld and Merton or Marxist scholar Miliband (see Herman, 1986; 
Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1957 [1948]; Miliband, 1987 [1973]: 203; Zollmann, 2009, 
2012). Furthermore, current research suggests that these same processes are highly 
relevant in the online realm (see Curran 2012: 19; McChesney, 2013; Zollmann, 2015c). 
 
The PM is further considered to be an accepted research model by a range of scholars 
(see e.g. Allan, 2004; Cottle, 2006; McChesney, 2008; Miller and Dinan, 2010; Sparks, 
2007; Thompson, 2009; Winter, 2007). McChesney (2008: 287) even argues that the 
PM ‘remains the starting point for any serious inquiry into news media performance’. 
The PM has also been applied to the US, UK, Canadian and German contexts, amongst 
others (for an overview see Zollmann, 2012). On the other hand, the PM has generally 
not obtained much attention in the Anglo-American social sciences (Chomsky, 1989; 
Mullen and Klaehn, 2010: 218). Although the shortfalls of the PM have been addressed, 
there has been a recurring tendency in academic treatises to rule it out without thorough 
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engagement (McChesney, 2007: 94). While the processes theorised by the PM are 
supported by a large body of scholarship, its conclusion, that the news media constitute 
a propaganda system, appears to be the reason for its negligence. In fact, scholarly 
treatises that produced similar findings like those of the PM scholars but, at the same 
time, did not use the propaganda terminology, appear to be more frequently and 
prominently cross-referenced in academia (see Herring and Robinson, 2003). This 
handling of the PM has to be seen in the context of the already identified trend in 
academia to neglect the concept of propaganda in relation to liberal democracies and 
their communication systems. The issue is further alleviated by the fact that scholars 
using the PM have not yet proven whether the media content pattern identified by the 
PM actually constitutes propaganda. Moreover, some critics of the PM have argued that 
journalistic non-intentionality as well as the news media’s rather factual and diverse 
output would render propaganda obsolete. It is thus important to elaborate on the 
concept of propaganda in more detail and assess as to whether it can be applied to the 
news media. Such an undertaking responds directly to Boyd-Barrett (2010: 32) who 
criticised the failure of PM scholars to identify the ‘mechanisms of propaganda in the 
text itself’. 
 
In the following, the essay proceeds in in several steps: (1) Propaganda will be defined 
in relation to the various definitions that exist in the literature; (2) The question of 
whether the proposed definition of propaganda can plausibly be applied to the news 
media will be discussed. This will be done with reference to findings on news media 
performance put forward by the PM and related scholars as well as the broader literature 
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on news and propaganda. During this course a number of indicators for news media 
mediated propaganda will be fleshed out (see Kromrey, 2009). 
 
Propaganda: a practical definition 
Propaganda has often been described as the intentional manipulation of public opinion 
(Bussemer, 2005: 28; also Jowett and O’Donnell, 1992: 4; Silverstein, 1987: 51). Allan 
(2004: 55-56) seems to start from a similar premise when he argues that news and 
propaganda should not be conflated because ‘the propagandist, unlike the journalist [...], 
sets out with the deliberate intention of deceiving the public, of concealing “the truth” 
so as to direct public opinion in a particular way’. According to such a view it is 
problematic to describe news media performance as propaganda because of the lack of 
intent on behalf of the journalists. This perspective assumes that propaganda must entail 
an element of intentionality in terms of its distribution by an agent. In contrast, an 
examination of the literature reveals that the intentional distribution of propaganda by 
an individual or group is only one among many types (Ellul, 1973: 79).2 Silverstein 
(1987: 51) argues ‘propaganda is spread in a variety of ways, ranging from intentional 
disinformation promulgated by governments to much more subtle examples’. The latter 
and subtle examples, this paper argues, include propaganda that may be distributed in an 
unintentional fashion by journalists. Such propaganda, of course, also entails an 
important intentional element. The actors and groups who own, fund and control the 
environment in which journalists operate – powerful owners, managers, advertisers, 
corporate affiliates, business lobbies and governments – actually have the intention to 
shape news media messages in accord with their interests, values and practices (see 
Herman 2000: 102). Yet significantly, this does not require intentional behaviour on 
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behalf of the distributor who may act as an unconscious intermediary. The following 
elaboration of a practical definition of propaganda further sheds light on this. 
 
According to Bussemer (2005: 29-30), who synthesized the numerous definitions of the 
term used in the social sciences, propaganda can be understood ‘as normally media 
mediated forming of action relevant opinions and attitudes of political or social groups 
through symbolic communication and as manufacturing of public in support of 
particular interests’.3 While this definition is useful, it seems to focus on the effect of 
propaganda, rather than the phenomenon itself. Yet, Bussemer also identified five 
conceptualizations of propaganda, which were applied in different theory contexts 
(2005: 33). He described one concept as ‘propaganda as primary agency of integration 
of the society’ (2005: 34): 
 
Here, propaganda is understood as a device to manufacture social coherence, 
which can both be systematically operated by central agencies of the society [...] 
but can also come as a spontaneous and unconscious diffusion of ideology from 
the members of a society. 
 
Such concepts of propaganda include institutionalised propaganda and do not imply 
intentional distribution by agents. This is in accord with a concept of news media 
mediated propaganda that the PM suggests and with what earlier scholars have 
described as integrating propaganda (or propaganda of integration) (see Ellul, 1973: 74; 
Silverstein, 1987: 50).4 However, for this perspective it is important to consider that 
while there is no intention on behalf of the journalist, there is intention on behalf of the 
agents and groups controlling the news media environment. These are powerful actors 
and institutions that aim to manipulate the news in accord with their class interest and 
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conscious (see Althusser, 1971: 154; Herman and Chomsky, 2008). Miller and Dinan 
(2008: 4) add a useful intentional dimension to the definition of propaganda. Miller and 
Dinan (2008: 4) understand PR itself, but also activities such as corporate lobbying, 
networking, media manipulation and social responsibility as propaganda. This focus 
investigates how social interests intentionally produce propaganda and on how this 
might impact on society and institutions like the news media (Miller and Dinan, 2010: 
1). 
 
A comprehensive definition of propaganda would therefore allow for a distinction 
between the distribution of propaganda, which may be conducted unintentional by 
journalists, as well as the actors who intentionally control the news media environment 
in order to manufacture public support and/or action. Furthermore, media as well as 
non-media mediated forms of propaganda should be accounted for, the latter of which 
include coercive measures (such as censorship or flak) (see also Elter 2005: 20 who 
provides a broad conceptualisation of propaganda). 
 
Acknowledging the contested terrain over what constitutes propaganda (see Miller and 
Dinan, 2008: 5), and incorporating the concepts of Bussemer (2005), Elter (2005) as 
well as Miller and Dinan (2008), propaganda can thus be understood as the forming of 
texts and opinions in support of particular interests and through media and non-media 
mediated means with the intention to produce public support and/or relevant action. 
 
Such a definition is relatively broad and proceeds on the assumption that liberal 
democratic societies are exposed to a range of propaganda techniques applied by 
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various institutions and actors. It is postulated that propaganda not only manifests in 
symbolic communication (i.e. media-mediated) but also in physical interventions (i.e. 
non-media mediated) whereas both techniques are aimed at shaping opinion and/or 
influencing behaviour (i.e. action relevant). Importantly, opinion does not necessarily 
need to change in order for action to be influenced. Furthermore, the definition suggests 
three categories for empirical enquiry that are (1) production and distribution, (2) 
content and (3) reception orientated: (1) Non-media mediated societal processes such as 
the institutional workings of PM’s ‘filters’, lobbying, strategic interventions, 
censorship, intimidation or violence. Here, the focus is on how institutions, groups or 
agents intentionally constrain other institutions, groups or agents and how this results in 
the manufacture of a particular image of reality or conformity to an agenda. This 
category is also about distributions of power and the use of coercive measures. 
Furthermore, the category grasps the intersection between intentional management of 
the news environment by agents or groups and the unintentional distribution of 
propaganda by journalists (2) Media mediated manifestations of propaganda such as 
content of media, PR, or advertising. Here, the focus is on how media content patterns 
are supportive to specific interests. (3) Effects of media propaganda such as changes in 
public attitudes and actions (see also Miller and Dinan 2010: 2).  
 
Implications for the news media 
In news media texts, propaganda manifests itself if content patterns are supportive to the 
specific interests that control the news environment. Journalistic performance largely 
derives from resulting organisational practices and pressures – as defined in PM’s 
‘filters’–, which journalists abide by (see Herman and Chomsky, 2008). Only rarely do 
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journalists act intentionally, as the primary agent of propaganda (for agency see Boyd-
Barrett, 2004).5  
 
If news media content patterns are in support of specific interests, this has implications 
because the normative arrays ascribed to news journalism are incongruent with 
propaganda. However, the suggested definition of propaganda does not yet incorporate 
a normative/ethical component. For instance, there are different opinions in the 
literature as to whether propaganda is always nefarious or may also entail benign 
elements (see Bakir et al., 2016). Drawing from the literature on propaganda, PR and 
strategic communication, Bakir et al.’s (2016) conceptual framework has overcome this 
contradiction by theorizing a broad set of OPC activities that accounts for consensual 
(benign) and non-consensual (nefarious) communication activities. Accordingly, OPC 
based on consensual communication includes categories such as dialogue or 
information. Non-consensual communication, on the other hand, includes categories 
such as deception, incentivisation and coercion (see 2016). In order to obtain analytical 
clarity, Bakir et al. (2016) argue that propaganda should be seen as a subset of OPC, 
namely the non-consensual and deceptive type. In accord with the OPC framework by 
Bakir et al. (2016), deception can be understood to  
 
involve… persuasion via lying, distortion, omission or misdirection. It is non-
consensual because it violates the requirement of informed consent; the target of 
persuasion is unable to reach an informed decision because of inadequate 
information [emphasis in the original]. 
  
As will be further elaborated below, elite supportive news media content patterns, 
although including a vast amount of information and facts, are largely based on 
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discourses that involve deception. In the following, I will therefore flesh out dimensions 
of news media propaganda that indicate different forms of deception and can be used 
and tested via content analysis (see Kromrey, 2009). These dimensions are derived from 
an integration as well as development of the literature on propaganda and related 
concepts. Furthermore, it will be demonstrated that news media propaganda in liberal 
democracies derives its strength from two neglected factors: unconscious ideological 
integration and factuality.  
 
Dimension 1: Integrating news media propaganda and ideology 
Bussemer’s (2005: 34) concept of the propaganda of integration described above 
suggests a link with ideology. Indeed, a strand in the literature regards ‘propaganda as a 
purveyor of ideology’ (Jowett and O’Donnell, 1992: 1). For instance, Ellul (1973: 63-
64) observed how ‘through the medium of economic and political structures a certain 
ideology is established’. 
 
In the case of the news media, propaganda can convey ideology if, in accord with Hall 
(1977), practices, values or meanings of a set of people or organisations are 
overrepresented in news coverage at the expense of others. Philo and Berry (2011: 174) 
used the term ‘interest-linked perspective’ for ideology. Again, the agents and groups 
who own, control and fund the news media or have the necessary political power to 
impact on journalistic selection processes are sufficiently able to transport their 
ideology in the news. Generally, as Robinson et al. (2010: 37) argued, ideological 
imperatives either promote ‘particular justifications for the substance of’ policy or 
‘marginalise or exclude alternative positions that might destabilise the dominant official 
 19 
frames that justify the substance of’ policy-making. Basically, ideological media 
propaganda is non-consensual because it works through omission (see Bakir et al., 
2016). For instance, it is well established by research that the formation of the news 
media within the political and corporate nexus leads to the overrepresentation of official 
political and corporate practices, values and meanings in media content at the expense 
of others (for an overview of the research see Zollmann, 2009, 2012). As a 
consequence, the foundations of state-corporate capitalism are rarely questioned in any 
sustained way (see Zollmann 2009). This constitutes the system maintaining function of 
the news media that, as mentioned in the introduction, Lazarsfeld and Merton (1957 
[1948]: 465) had identified. There are several manifestations for such integrating 
ideological propaganda: 
  
- Interest linked frames about events, issues or actors (cf. Entman, 2004: 26; 
Herman and Chomsky, 2008: LI; Philo and Berry, 2011: 174): in such cases, the 
news tends to highlight certain perspectives thereby legitimising the actions of 
state-corporate actors and/or the contemporary system of state-corporate 
capitalism via omission of other perspectives (cf. Philo and Berry, 2011: 174).  
- Absence/omission of substantial criticism, which was found in virtually all 
studies on elite media coverage of foreign policy (see Zollmann, 2015a): the 
news media coherently situates US and UK foreign policy as benevolent, thus 
omitting its underlying economic goals as well as destructive outcomes from 
public visibility and discussion. Such propaganda is a device, which uses 
‘glittering generalities’ (Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 1995 [1937]: 219). 
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- The descriptions of events and actions can be ideological if they relate to 
contested ideological concepts such as ‘war’, ‘crime’, ‘massacre’, ‘genocide’, 
‘terrorism’, ‘democracy’ or ‘socialism’ (cf. Herman and Peterson, 2010; Keeble, 
1997; Zollmann 2017). To use the concept or ‘war’ to describe events or actions 
that have the properties of ‘war crimes’ or ‘state-terrorism’ is propagandistic. 
Similarly, to use the concepts of ‘massacre’ or ‘genocide’ to describe events that 
entail significant elements of fighting during battle is propagandistic as 
important elements are omitted (see Herman and Peterson, 2010; Zollmann, 
2017). 
 
Generally, these content indicators can be used to test PM’s first order predictions about 
consensual ideological aspects that bound the ‘spectrum of opinion allowed expression’ 
(Chomsky, 1989: 59). Propaganda manifests when content is aligned with state-
corporate ideology (i.e. practices, values, meanings or interest-linked perspectives). 
This operationalisation is valid because, as Jowett and O’Donnell (1992: 214) stressed, 
one purpose of propaganda is ‘to maintain the legitimacy of the institution or 
organisation that it represents and thereby ensure the legitimacy of its activities’. 
 
The functionality of integrating propaganda can be shown if the concept is related to 
audiences and actions: educated elites are prime targets of propaganda because they 
have decision-making power, can influence policies and are receptive to propaganda 
(see Chomsky, 1989: 38, 47, 149; DiMaggio, 2009: 233; Ellul, 1973: 76; Miller and 
Dinan, 2008: 180). Furthermore, when corporate capitalism or the current international 
hegemonic system is one-dimensionally represented as benevolent, this constitutes what 
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Hall, Gramsci as well as Miller and Dinan would define as ideological hegemony. 
According to Miller and Dinan (2010: 3) ‘leadership of allied class fractions is essential 
and perhaps one of the greatest effects of ideological warfare’. A goal of ideological 
warfare is to achieve relative unity of the ruling elite (Miller and Dinan, 2010: 3). As 
Miller and Dinan (2020: 3) further write, unity results in ‘“ruling ideas”’ and, more 
importantly, ‘ruling practices and this in turn implies that these are able to constrain or 
minimize oppositional ideas and practice’.6 Many discourses might foster unity amongst 
elites and this is still an open empirical question. But to give one example: A discourse 
of Western benevolence, as identified in a range of content studies (see Zollmann, 2012, 
2015a), fosters ruling class unity among elites who have decision-making power over or 
a stake in foreign policy because its one-dimensionality has great potential for 
minimising other ideas and practices. For instance, any policy, which demands the 
abandonment of substantive foreign policy norms, such as the assumed right of Western 
states to intervene in other countries, are excluded from discussion. Thus, as Silverstein 
(1987: 50) argued, such propaganda promotes ‘at least implicit support’ for policies 
among elites. Miller and Dinan defined this as the ‘manufacture of compliance’ (2008: 
6). Ellul (1973: 63, 75) used the phrase to rationalise an existing situation or to produce 
‘a progressive adaption to a certain order of things’.7 That is the integrative element of 
this type of propaganda. In the literature, a dichotomy between integrating and agitating 
propaganda is assumed, with the latter inciting action (see Silverstein, 1987: 49-50). 
However, integrating propaganda is also linked to action because it seeks not only 
support for existing conditions but also aims to enable particular policies. Integrating 
propaganda is thus twofold: it strives to manufacture compliant behaviour of certain 
elite fractions (e.g. legislative political, professional, or managerial elites) but can also 
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impact on the decision-making power of other elite fractions (e.g. executive political 
elites). Thus, integrating propaganda can enhance the ability to act. Of course, 
propaganda might also more directly agitate action and such cases will be discussed 
below (see Silverstein, 1987: 49). 
 
Dimension 2: Technological news media propaganda and ‘truth’ 
A significant manifestation of journalism practice in liberal democracy is what Hallin 
described as the ‘technical angle’ or ‘the tendency to frame and analyse events in terms 
of strategy and tactics, success and failure’ (1994: 20-21). This performance, which is 
related to the application of professional norms and conventions, manifests itself in the 
heavy prevalence of procedural/tactical criticism particularly during periods of elite 
conflict when the news media appears to feature factual journalism and independent 
contributions to the political debate (see Zollmann, 2012, 2015a). Furthermore, the 
technical angle prevails in coverage on human rights violations when preventive policy 
options are evaluated (cf. Robinson, 2000; Zollmann, 2017). 
 
Hence, journalistic scrutiny of government policies could be observed during the later 
stages of the Vietnam War or during the 2003 Iraq War when Western elites were 
divided or favoured different policies. Moreover, critical coverage of high-level 
corruption, such as during the Watergate, News International phone hacking (i.e. 
‘Hackgate’) and NSA scandals, was sustained because sectional elite interests were 
affected (cf. Chomsky, 1989: 149). In other cases, the media carried perspectives in 
support of ‘preventive’ war against Iraq (before the 2003 Iraq War) or advocated 
policies such as military interventions to stop alleged human rights violations in the 
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Balkans, Libya and Syria (see Zollmann, 2017). When elite interests are disregarded, 
such performances can be seen as evidence for a liberal or politically powerful media, 
that obtained leeway over the political system because it scrutinised governments or 
triggered military interventions (see Chomsky, 1989: 13; Robinson, 2000: 405-406; 
Robinson et al., 2010: 122-123). 
 
In contrast, a propaganda framework situates such media diversity and advocacy within 
the dominant ideology (Chomsky, 1989: 13). That might explain why Hallin, who 
conflates a propaganda system with one-dimensionality (see 1994: 13, 26, 36), alleged 
the PM to constitute a ‘unidimensional’ model (1994: 13). However, Hallin’s 
perception differs from that of the PM not in regard to the existence but classification of 
diversity. The PM does not postulate one-dimensional performance. As Chomsky 
explained, media ‘reflect the range of debate over tactical questions among dominant 
elites’ (1989: 11). ‘Controversy may rage’, Chomsky argues, ‘as long as it adheres to 
the presuppositions that define the consensus of elites’ (1989: 48) – the latter evident in 
the ideological consensuses discussed in the previous section. Within this universe, 
Chomsky stressed, professional journalism can operate with integrity and commitment 
(1989: 11). In this sense, media are not monolithic, however, diversity is bounded by an 
elite consensus. In fact, this kind of propaganda is factual, albeit selective. It can thus be 
classified as misdirection aimed at shifting public attention towards specific areas of 
policy that have elite utility (see Bakir et al., 2016). Hence, under such considerations, 
the technical, procedural nature of journalism can be included in a propaganda 
framework. 
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For an understanding of technological propaganda, the political position of elites has to 
be further examined. Entman and Page (1994: 90) argued that procedural criticism, even 
if decoded ‘as disguised attacks’ on policies, provides the public with ‘little cognitive 
basis for participating in deliberation’ because major issues remain obscured. On the 
other hand, procedural discourses can be important, Entman and Page (1994: 90) 
stressed, by placing ‘pressure on administrations [...] to consult Congress’. This may 
enhance ‘the possibility of democratic dialogue’ particularly when the press provides a 
wide range of information (Entman and Page, 1994: 90). However, the latter argument 
assumes a functioning liberal democratic system. But in contemporary elite-managed 
democracies, it makes more sense to see procedural criticism as an expression of 
fractional elite discontent enabling elites to deliberate and pressure administrations to 
change policies. Accordingly, Miller and Dinan (2010: 2) argued propaganda can 
manifest as ‘intra-elite communications’ and there are instances when elites 
‘communicate via the media with other elites’. Hence, the technical angle is supportive 
to elites who aim to correct or propose government policies. In the latter instances, this 
can even lead to ‘media-driven intervention’ (Robinson, 2000: 405). Generally, 
technological reporting resembles the ‘propaganda of agitation’ (Ellul, 1973: 70-71).8 
 
It makes also sense to assume that propaganda needs to be based on a relatively fair and 
factual portrayal of events so that privileged elites are able to effectively make decisions 
based on it (see Chomsky, 1989: 151).  
 
Content indicators for technological propaganda are: 
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- Procedural/tactical criticism bounded by consensual areas whereas criticisms 
can be linked with elite reproaches (misdirecting elite opinion).  
- Coverage that incites political or military action (indignation, misdirecting 
publics to agree to actions) (see Zollmann, 2017). 
 
Next to the procedural type, technological propaganda also manifests itself in factual, 
albeit distorted coverage (see Bakir et al, 2016). As Herman and Chomsky (1988: 15) 
have argued: more important than the suppression of information is the way the press 
presents ‘a particular fact – its placement, tone, and frequency of repetition―and the 
framework in which it is placed’. Similarly, the Institute for Propaganda Analysis 
argued in propagandistic discourses ‘under-emphasis and over-emphasis’ are used ‘to 
dodge issues and evade facts’ (1995 [1937]: 221). In such instances, various indicators 
for technological propaganda exist: 
  
- The use of facts within a certain framework at the expense of other frameworks 
that match with the facts (distortion). There is interplay between integrating and 
technological propaganda: the frameworks within which the facts are placed are 
the ideological dimensions of the media discourse. 
- Marginalisation of facts or statements in regard to their placement and repetition 
(i.e. emphasis, weighting) as well as interpretation (i.e. de-emphasis). 
- The use of facts about an issue while, at the same time, other important facts 
about the same issue are neglected or marginalised. 
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The validity of the dimension of factual propaganda can be substantiated with 
references to the work of early propaganda theorists: in his treatment of propaganda 
during World War I, Lasswell (1971 [1927]: 200) outlined one tactical objective of 
propaganda as ‘to avoid untruth which is likely to be contradicted before the 
achievement of the strategic purpose’. Propaganda can be exposed as such if it is too far 
off from real events. Therefore, propaganda is assumed to be more effective when it is 
grounded in verifiable facts and occurrences.  
 
Ellul (1973: 85) observed that, in conjunction with societal progression, propaganda has 
become more rational, informative and factual so that nowadays it is unusual to detect 
propaganda ‘composed solely of claims without relation to reality’. Indeed, according to 
Ellul (1973: 85): ‘Propaganda’s content increasingly resembles information.’ 
Particularly during wartime, Ellul further suggested, ‘successful propaganda is that 
based directly on obvious facts’ (1973: 84). Similarly, Merton (1968: 578-579) 
demarcated the argumentative type of propaganda, which he called ‘technological 
propaganda or the propaganda of facts’, from a rather crude incendiary type. Assessing 
earlier studies of propaganda, Merton found that people were more willing to believe 
propaganda if it was grounded in facts (1968: 579).  
 
Hallin (1994: 30) still argued ‘functional assumptions can be dangerous’ because 
‘cultural institutions do not always develop in ways that are functional for the 
established social order’. Hence, Hallin saw conflicts between the media and other 
societal institutions such as during the 1960s and 1970s as evidence for ‘some degree of 
openness’ (1994: 36). Scholars also emphasised the existence of autonomous reporting 
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and dissident writers as evidence for more variation (for a discussion see Keeble, 2010: 
53-54). The news media, Hallin (1994: 32) wrote, must ‘maintain the integrity of their 
relationship with their audience’ and the integrity ‘of the social relationships that make 
up the profession of journalism’. It is therefore, the argument goes, that there must be a 
certain degree of openness, which is inconsistent with propaganda.  
 
In contrast, Herman and Chomsky stressed that these deviant elements are ‘not large 
enough to interfere unduly with the domination of the official agenda’ (2008: XII).9 
Moreover, media owners and corporate managers are sufficiently positioned to restrain 
deviant commentators if their writings negatively impact on profits or conflict with the 
interests of shareholders and advertisers. As Lazarsfeld and Merton (1957 [1948]): 466) 
observed, ‘“progressive” views are of slight importance since they are included only by 
the grace of the sponsors’.10 
 
Dimension 3: Demonising news media propaganda and outrage 
One of the central objectives of propaganda, particularly applied during times of war, is 
what Lasswell (1971 [1927]: 195) termed ‘to mobilise hatred against the enemy’. I use 
the term demonisation for this kind of propaganda aimed at representing an oppositional 
country ‘as a menacing, murderous aggressor’ (Lasswell, 1971 [1927]: 195). 
Demonisation presents the enemy in contrast to the noble aims of the home state and 
like other devices it aims at enforcing the goals of the propagandist (see Lasswell, 1971 
[1927]: 195). Because of its selectivity, this form of propaganda involves distortion, 
omission, and/or misdirection (see Bakir et al., forthcoming). There are various content 
indicators for demonisation:  
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- Negative association or name-calling is used to attach unreasonable labels to 
opposition actors, groups or countries (Institute for Propaganda Analysis (1995 
[1937]: 218). Name-calling applies labels that do not match with the factual 
record or that are used selectively.  
- Atrocities and nefarious actions by so-called ‘enemy’ states of Western 
governments are focused and/or exaggerated (Herman and Chomsky, 2008: 29-
33; Silverstein, 1987: 53; Zollmann, 2017). For example, nefarious labels are 
used to describe events and actions without the existence of conclusive evidence 
and/or weighing of contradicting facts. Indignation, details of slaughter and 
responsibility for nefarious actions are highlighted disproportionately and 
selectively if compared to similar actions conducted by other actors, groups or 
states (for examples see Herman and Chomsky, 2008; Herman and Peterson, 
2010; Zollmann 2015b, 2017). 
 
Conclusion 
This article argues that institutional processes lead the news media to propagate output 
supportive of dominant state-corporate elite interests. It was therefore demonstrated, on 
the basis of early and contemporary scholarship, that the institutional environment of 
the news media allows powerful agents and groups to intentionally manage the news 
arena and thereby guide journalistic selection and production processes. As a 
consequence, journalists produce and distribute propaganda without intending to do so 
and on behalf of dominant state-corporate interests. Additionally, the essay 
demonstrates that theoretical conceptualisations of what constitutes propaganda can be 
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applied with validity to the content structures of media texts: the prevalence of 
ideological media content pattern, the selective use of facts, or the emphasis and de-
emphasis of certain facts and perspectives constitutes propaganda as identified by 
leading scholars in the field. As this essay constitutes a first step of bringing propaganda 
back into news media studies, more research is needed. The proposed content indicators 
for news media mediated propaganda should be tested and refined. There is also scope 
for the development of other indicators that could be used as part of the proposed tool 
box to detect propaganda in media content. The terminology about different forms of 
news media mediated propaganda should be further clarified and refined on the basis of 
Bakir et al.’s (2016) OPC framework (see also Herring and Robinson, 2014-2015). 
Moreover, the institutional processes that lead the news media to produce and distribute 
propaganda on behalf of dominant elite interests should be further assessed in order to 
account for what Miller and Dinan (2010: 2) described as the ‘“circuit” of 
communication’. While evidence points to the commercial structure of the news media 
as a major concern, more research is needed to understand how outside pressures of 
lobby groups impact on news media performance. It could be argued that these forces 
have obtained even more importance in the 21st century. This is so because powerful 
actors are currently using a range of OPC techniques to counter open spaces in the 
digital communication environment that potentially allows for diverse communication 
activities (see also Zollmann, 2015c). Consequently, the significance of the forces that 
are engaged in what Herring and Robinson (2014-2015: 557) termed ‘organized 
political persuasion’ need to be further assessed in relation to the news media. Similarly, 
more research is needed in regard to how these interests influence public service and 
online news providers. Finally, it should be noted that this essay points to the continued 
 30 
relevance of propaganda in contemporary communication, media and journalism 
studies. In fact, the disappearance of propaganda from studies of liberal democracies 
and their news media and communication systems inhibits critical scrutiny and 
constitutes a triumph of propaganda in itself. 
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Notes 
                                                          
1  Jowett and O’Donnell (1992: 89) saw newspapers as ‘a prime source of propaganda in our society’. 
2  Ellul used the term ‘vertical’ propaganda for the intentional type (1973: 79). 
3  This and later quotations from Bussemer’s text were translated by the author. 
4  The references to Bussemer in this section were already used by this author in another text (see 
Zollmann, 2009). 
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5  Gatekeeper scholars have suggested the importance of structural/institutional constraints in accord 
with PM’s ‘filters’ at the expense of agency, which is subordinate. However, an institutional approach 
does not rule out agency if individual conduct is concordant with the priorities of those controlling the 
‘filters’. Indeed, research which pointed to the prevalence of what can be termed as agency driven 
coverage, when secret services or other agents manipulated the news, suggested consistency between 
state-corporate and agent agendas (see Boyd-Barrett, 2004; Keeble, 1997). On the other hand, agents 
who drove deviant agendas in the news have been marginal exceptions (see Keeble, 2010: 53). That is 
why in conclusion, a net effect on media output as a result of the workings of institutional constraints 
such as PM’s ‘filters’ is not only theoretically plausible but also supported by a large body of 
empirical scholarship. 
6  Elites are understood as ‘the government [including the executive, legislative and judiciary as well as 
the military], the leaders of the corporate community, the top media owners and executives, and 
assorted individuals and groups who are assigned or allowed to take constructive initiatives’ (Herman 
and Chomsky, 2008: L). Furthermore, as the investment theory of political parties suggested, a 
propaganda model assumes that major political parties are dominated by large investor groups whose 
interests they represent. Thus, political parties and candidates tend to support varying corporate-
business-elite interests (see Ferguson, 1995: 22-29). It could thus be argued that elite propaganda is 
important to facilitate ideological bondage between political and corporate elites. Moreover, 
propaganda has to ensure that the educated and politically active middle class is compliant (see 
Rogers, 2010: 248). 
7  Such propaganda also manifested for other purpose such as to stabilise the social system in the sense 
of ‘unifying and reinforcing it’ (Ellul, 1973: 75).  
8  According to Ellul, the propaganda of agitation was applied in favor of oppositional elite blocs in 
order to debilitate the home government or to incite civil uprisings. Furthermore, it could be used by 
governments to mobilise for war (see 1973: 70-71). 
9  Like Hallin, Herman and Chomsky acknowledged the possibility of punctual dissent encouraged by 
professional journalistic integrity and other counterforces such as technology driven changes which 
may broaden access to the media (2008: 285-287). But while Hallin seems to regard openings as 
examples for a more independent system, Herman and Chomsky considered the exceptional nature of 
such occurrences suggesting that, as long as the news media are not radically changed, such secondary 
effects will be absorbed by the reinforcing ‘filters’ of the propaganda system (see Zollmann, 2009).  
10  Deviant commentators are important to remain the credibility of the media institution. Credibility has 
been a concern for other propaganda systems: an analysis of allied and Nazi government propaganda 
during World War II highlighted how ‘an essential element in scientific propaganda is the 
establishment and maintenance of credibility’ (Mathews, 1957: 177). The advantage of distorted 
military news, it was shown, could be jeopardised if conflicting facts emerged later. Moreover, 
because propaganda was aimed at influencing allied policies, it needed to include accurate facts 
(Mathews, 1957: 177, 235). Generally, propaganda can be more effective if it contains verifiable 
information, a fact which was already recognized by the German Nazis whose propaganda relied on a 
‘truthful portrayal of facts’ - if necessary (Mathews, 1957: 186). 
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